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Abstract. Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS), such as Microsoft Azure, 
Amazon AWS, offers an effective DNN model to complete the machine learning 
task for small businesses and individuals who are restricted to the lacking data 
and computing power. However, here comes an issue that user privacy is ex-
posed to the MLaaS server, since users need to upload their sensitive data to the 
MLaaS server. In order to preserve their privacy, users can encrypt their data 
before uploading it. This makes it difficult to run the DNN model because it is 
not designed for running in ciphertext domain. 
In this paper, using the Paillier homomorphic cryptosystem we present a new 
Privacy-Preserving Deep Neural Network model that we called 2P-DNN. This 
model can fulfill the machine leaning task in ciphertext domain. By using 
2P-DNN, MLaaS is able to provide a Privacy-Preserving machine learning ser-
vice for users. We build our 2P-DNN model based on LeNet-5, and test it with 
the encrypted MNIST dataset. The classification accuracy is more than 97%, 
which is close to the accuracy of LeNet-5 running with the MNIST dataset and 
higher than that of other existing Privacy-Preserving machine learning models. 
Keywords: Privacy-Preserving machine learning, Neural Networks, Machine 
Learning as a Service, Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem. 
1 Introduction 
Machine learning is an application of artificial intelligence (AI) that provides systems 
the ability to automatically learn and improve from experience without being explicitly 
programmed. Machine learning focuses on the development of computer programs that 
can access data and use it to learn for themselves. Machine learning is widely used in 
various fields and becomes an important part of AI. 
Restricted to the lacking data and computing power, small businesses and individu-
als do not have the resources and ability of machine learning, especially in deep 
learning. To solve this problem, many cloud computing vendors provide a server 
called Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) such as Microsoft Azure Machine 
Learning Studio and Amazon AWS Machine Learning. With MLaaS, users can use 
the machine learning model and computing resource on the Cloud to fulfill their ma-
chine learning tasks. 
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However, the current MLaaS models do not consider to preserve user privacy, 
which prohibits its application and development. For example, intelligent medical on 
MLaaS may expose some private health information of patients. So, it is important to 
build a Privacy-Preserving MLaaS model which is able to run in the encrypted do-
main. Specifically, an MLaaS server runs the model with encrypted data and users get 
the predictions after decrypting the model output that is in ciphertext domain. 
Aiming to preserve user privacy in MLaaS, we propose a Privacy-Preserving Deep 
Neural Network model (2P-DNN) based on the Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem. 
Our 2P-DNN model can run in the encrypted domain and give a prediction when in-
put with encrypted data. The accuracy of our model is close to the same model in 
plaintext domain. 
Our contributions are as follows: 
1) We design a Privacy-Preserving Deep Neural Network model. Compared to the 
current Privacy-Preserving machine learning models[1,2,3,4], our model does not limit 
the input range and has the higher accuracy.  
2) We build our 2P-DNN model based on LeNet-5, and test it with the encrypted 
MNIST dataset. The classification accuracy is not less than 99%, which is close to the 
accuracy of LeNet-5 running with the MNIST dataset and higher than other existing 
Privacy-Preserving machine learning models[4]. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related 
work. In Section 3, we introduce the Homomorphic Cryptosystem and the Deep Neu-
ral Network[5,6]. Then Section 4 presents our 2P-DNN model. In Section 5, we build 
our 2P-DNN model based on LeNet-5, and test it with the encrypted MNIST dataset. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper. 
2 Related Work 
As for the importance of Privacy-Preserving machine learning model, there have been 
several excellent contributions in this field. These contributions mainly focus on two 
aspects, based on the traditional machine learning[1,2] and based on Deep Neural Net-
work[3,4].  
Some traditional machine learning models have linearity, which makes them able 
to run in the encrypted domain of Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE). By 
using this property, Raphael Bost et al. proposed a machine learning classification 
model over encrypted data[1]. They constructed three privacy-preserving classification 
algorithms: hyperplane decision, Naïve Bayes, and decision trees. They also combined 
these constructions with Adaboost. Louis J. M. Aslett et al. proposed a statistical ma-
chine learning model against encrypted samples[2]. By using Fully Homomorphic En-
cryption (FHE), they implemented a cryptographic random forest whose accuracy is 
lower than deep learning model. 
In addition, some researchers use deep learning model to implement Priva-
cy-Preserving MLaaS model. Nathan Dowlin et al. proposed CryptoNets [3]. They use 
the square function as the active function. But the square function results in that the 
computing resource cost becomes prohibitive as the number of layers increases, which 
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is not adapted deep learning. To solve this problem, Florian Bourse et al. proposed a 
new framework (FHE-DiNN) for homomorphic evaluation of neural networks[4]. They 
refine the recent FHE algorithm proposed by Chillotti et al[7], in order to increase the 
message space and apply the sign function during the bootstrapping. However the input 
values of FHE-DiNNs are limited in {-1,1}, which greatly restricts its application.  
3 Preliminaries 
3.1 Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem 
Homomorphic cryptosystem was first introduced by Rivest et al.[8], which allows one 
to directly operate the ciphertext and obtain the equivalent results in the plaintext do-
main without decrypting. The Paillier cryptosystem is a public key cryptosystem and 
a somewhat homomorphic cryptosystem[9]. The cryptosystem has been proved to be 
semantically secure. It provides homomorphic properties in terms of addictive and 
scalar multiplication, and is computationally comparable to RSA. The concrete Pailli-
er cryptosystem is sketched as follows. 
Key Generation. Let p, q to be two large primes and pqN  . Let 
 2 20,1, , 1NZ N  and 2 2N NZ Z
  denotes the set including nonnegative integers 
which have multiplicative inverses module
2N . We also need to choose 2
*
N
g Z sat-
isfying   2gcd mod , 1L g N N  . Here, ( 1, 1)lcm p q    and we use it as the pri-
vate key. The pair ),( gN is the corresponding public key. 
Encryption. Take a plaintext Nm Z , to encrypt m and get the ciphertext c, we 
compute: 
   2, modm Nc E m r g r N  , (1) 
Where
*
Nr Z is an integer chosen randomly. 
Decryption. When we get secret keyλ, we can decrypt the ciphertext 2Nc Z and 
get the plaintext m as: 
  
 
 
2
2
mod
, mod
mod
L c N
m D c N
L g N


  , (2) 
Where  
1u
L u
N

 . 
  Homomorphic Property. The Paillier cryptosystem has addictive homomorphic 
property. That is, 
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The exponential of g is precisely the ciphertext of 1 2m m . In other words, we can get 
1 2m m after decrypting the result. Furthermore, we can get another from Equation 
(3) which is: 
 
 
   
2 2
1 2
2
1 1 1
2
1 2
mod ,
                        mod
m m
Nm m
c g N E m r g
g r r N

  

. (4) 
We can also get 1 2m m by decrypting this result. 
  In addition, the Paillier cryptosystem is homomorphic in terms of scalar multiplica-
tion. That is, 
   2, mod mod
k
D E m r N k m N   
 
. (5) 
A modular exponential operation in ciphertext domain is equivalent to performing 
computing k m in the plaintext. 
  We have to discuss the encryption on negative integers in this paper because the 
weight and bias of DNN might be negative. Paillier Cryptosystem does not involve 
negative integers, so some scholars design a novel method to solve this problem[10]. 
By dividing the encrypted domain into two equal spaces, one denotes positive integers 
and the other negative integers. The specific process can be described as: 
a) Using this method to decrypt the data correctly needs to meet the condition 
in the formula. 
  2sup 1m N   (6) 
where 𝑠𝑢𝑝⁡(∙) denotes the biggest value in plaintext. m is the absolute 
value of plaintext, N is one of the Paillier public keys. 
b) We compute this for encrypt a negative message –𝑚: 
        
1 1mod
1*
N
E m E m E m E m
 
      (7) 
Where m denotes a positive number in plaintext domain and N is one of the 
Paillier public keys. We use the first half of 𝑍𝑁  to denote the positive 
numbers and the second negative.  
c) If the modulus of the cryptosystem is N, the ]][[ mED is equal to Nm mod)(  
by m . Let us denote (𝑚)𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑁 by m . To decrypt the messages in-
cluding negative numbers, one does as follows: 
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  
   
   
               / 2
        / 2
n
D c m N
D c
D c N m N

 
 
. (8) 
d) Since the Paillier cryptosystem can only operate in the integer domain, we 
need to enlarge a non-integer value by multiplying it with an amplifying 
factor. 
3.2 Deep Neural Networks 
Deep Neural Network (DNN) is an important machine learning model in MLaaS. In 
recent years deep neural networks, such as Deep Auto Encoder, Convolutional Neural 
Network, and Recurrent Neural Networks, have shown to be capable of most machine 
learning tasks. Here, we briefly introduce the DNN structure and some key part of it. 
Fig.1 shows the DNN structure. We feed the input data to input layer. After a series 
of computation through the DNN, at the output layer we get the predicted result in 
terms of a task. At each layer, the output is sent to the next layer as its input, which is 
shown in Fig.2. We can write the output yi as: 
 )( 
i
iijj bxWfy . (9) 
Here, xi is the input, and W ij  represents the weights. The function )(f is the active 
function. 
 
            Fig. 1. DNN structure              Fig. 2. DNN linear transform 
  The active function is a special part of DNN. It is used to describe the non-linear 
transform, whose performance is better than the linear transform. Rectified Linear Unit 
(ReLU) function is the most commonly used active function[11,12]. We can describe 
ReLU as ),0max( xy  , which is shown in Fig.3. 
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Fig. 3. ReLU function 
  CNN (Convolutional Neural Network) is widely used in Computer Vision and it is 
also an important model in MLaaS. CNN is a special kind of DNN, since it has a 
Convolution layer within each neuron. In the following, we only describe the special 
Convolution layers of CNN in some detail. A convolution layer accomplishes two 
operations, the convolution and the pooling. The Convolution can be formally de-
scribed as follow: 
   
m n
njminmji bxwa ,,, , (10) 
where a ji, , w nm, , x njmi  , and b  respectively represent the convolution output, 
the weights, the input and the bias. Pooling operation follows a convolution, and there 
are two pooling methods: max pooing and average pooling. The output of max pooling 
is the max value in pool. The average pooling is computing the average of values in 
pool. 
4 Privacy-Preserving Deep Neural Networks Model 
Considering the user privacy in MLaaS, we design 2P-DNN, a Privacy-Preserving 
Deep Learning model. In order to achieve an equivalent capability to the original DNN 
model, we do not change the DNN structure in the plaintext domain. In the 2P-DNN 
model, the input data is encrypted by users for protecting their privacy, and only users 
can decrypt and get the output. To fulfill the same MLaaS task as the plaintext domain, 
we need to improve most of the DNN algorithms, including linear transforms, active 
functions, convolution and pooling. The rest of this section focuses on the details of 
these improved algorithms. 
4.1 Linear Transform 
We use )(E  to represent the Paillier encryption algorithm. Thus, )(xE i is the en-
crypted input data, and )( yE j  is the corresponding output that is also in ciphertext 
domain. According to the homomorphism of the Paillier algorithm, the linear trans-
form of DNN algorithms can be improved as follow: 
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
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ij][][
][][
. (11) 
Here, W ij  , b  , xi  and y j respectively represent the weights, bias, input and output. 
We can consider this computation as a linear transform layer. As shown in Equation 
(11), we can get the output )( yE j  directly from )(xE i  and )(bE  without decrypt-
ing. Then, the output )( yE j  
is taken as the input of the active function )(f . 
4.2 Active Function 
We choose ReLU as the active function of our model. Different from other active 
functions such as the Sigmoid function, ReLU is convenient to compute for our mod-
el. Since the ReLU function needs to judge the positivity or negativity of its input, we 
design an interactive protocol with which a server can compute ReLU by cooperating 
with its user. As minutely depicted in Fig. 4, the server-side sends the input data of 
ReLU to the client-side. Then, client-side decrypts it and sends the positivity or nega-
tivity of its plaintext to the server-side. The ReLU function of the server-side com-
putes its output as






00
0
x
xx
y . 
 
Fig. 4. Compute the ReLU function 
4.3 Convolution and Pooling 
Via convolution and pooling transform, CNN is able to achieve a superior perfor-
mance. In terms of the homomorphism of the Paillier algorithm, the convolution algo-
rithm in CNN can be improved as follow: 
 






m n
njmi
W
m n
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)()(
,
,,,
,
, (12) 
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  Following a convolution, a pooling operation comes. There are two kinds of pool-
ing, max pooling and average pooling. If we choose max pooling, we need to compare 
the values in ciphertext, which is difficult. In our model, we choose the average pool-
ing as the pooling function, and design the pooling function in ciphertext as follow: 
 




i
i s
i
xE
x
s
EyE
][
]
1
[][
1
, (13) 
where s  is the stride of the pooling function.  
5 2P-DNN Model on MNIST Dataset 
In this section, we give the experimental evaluation with respect to the 2P-DNN mod-
el in the encrypted domain. We choose LeNet model in plaintext to fulfill the classi-
fication task on MNIST database which includes a great many handwritten digits. We 
implement our scheme using Python3.6 on a server with Intel® Xeon E5-2603 v4 
CPU, 32G RAM, Nvidia Geforce GTX 1080Ti GPU. 
5.1 Training the Model in Plaintext 
In MLaaS, the server-side has a well trained model, with which MLaaS can provide 
classification service for users. Therefore, in this experimentation we first train a 
model with the MNIST dataset in plaintext. Then, we map this well trained model 
into a 2P-DNN model in ciphertext which is able to classify an encrypted object.  
We use TensorFlow[13], an open source software library for DNN, to train a Le-
Net-5 model in the plaintext domain. As shown in Fig.5, this model consists of two 
convolution layers and two full connection layers. We use the MNIST[14] training da-
taset to train our MLaaS model based on LeNet-5. The MNIST training dataset has a 
training set of 60,000 examples. After training, the accuracy of our model achieves 
99% on the MNIST testing dataset, which has a test set of 10,000 examples. 
 
Fig. 5. LeNet-5 model 
9 
5.2 Encrypting Input Data Encryption 
Aiming to verify the effectiviness of the proposed model, we use the MNIST data-
base[15] of handwritten digits. This database includes a training set with 60,000 exam-
ples and a test set with 10,000 examples. Each image is size-normalized as 28x28 and a 
single pixel value is less than 256. In this experiment, we use the Paillier cryptosystem 
to encrypt an image at the pixel level. We encrypt each pixel by Paillier cryptosystem, 
and the algorithms come from Phe1.3.1[16], a library for Partially Homomorphic En-
cryption in Python. As demonstrated in Fig.6, the encrypted images do not reveal any 
trace of the handwritten digits. So, as we expect, this method is able to preserve user 
privacy.  
 
Fig. 6. Input data in plaintext and ciphertext 
5.3 Implementing the Model in Ciphertext 
Section 4 gives the main algorithms with which we can transform a fully trained Le-
Net-5 model into a 2P-DNN model. In this section, we present a privacy-preserving 
MLaaS based on these algorithms. As illustrated in Fig.7, this model is able to classi-
fy encrypted images.  
 
Fig. 7. Privacy-preserving MLaaS based on LeNet-5 in ciphertext 
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The details of our Privacy-preserving MLaaS is as follows: 
  1) The client-side encrypts a picture and initiates a request carrying this encrypted 
picture. 
2) At the convolution layer, the input image is filtered as Equation (12), and then 
sent to the client-side. After receiving the return from the client-side, the server-side 
computes the ReLU output according to the plus or minus of the convolution output. 
After ReLU, the server-side does the pooling operation as Equation (13). 
3) Following two rounds of convolution and pooling, it comes to the full connec-
tion layers. At each full connection layer, the server-side first computes the linear 
transformation, and then does the ReLU operation just like the convolution layers. 
The last full connection layer gives the predicted results in the encrypted domain. 
4) At last, the server-side sends the encrypted result to the client-side, and the cli-
ent-side can get the results in plaintext after decrypting it. 
On the MNIST dataset encrypted by the Paillier cryptosystem, we get the accuracy 
of this model illustrated as the following table. 
Table 1. Accuracy in plaintext and ciphertext. 
Convolution kernel 
size and number 
The number of the 
full-connect layers 
Accuracy in 
plaintext 
Accuracy in 
ciphertext 
(3*3, 32) 512 99.0% 98.6% 
(3*3, 64) 512 99.1% 98.8% 
(5*5, 32) 512 99.0% 98.7% 
(5*5, 64) 512 99.2% 98.9% 
(3*3, 32) 1024 99.2% 98.9% 
(3*3, 64) 1024 99.2% 99.0% 
(5*5, 32) 1024 99.3% 99.0% 
(5*5, 64) 1024 99.3% 99.0% 
Table 2. Whether FHE-DiNNs and 2P-DNN can be applicate on classic datasets. 
Model MNIST CIFAR 10 Iris Data Set Wine Data Set 
FHE-DiNNs     
2P-DNN     
 
As shown in Table 1, the accuracy of our model in ciphertext is close to that of 
LeNet-5 model in plaintext. The accuracy loss compared to plaintext model is due to 
the weight accuracy loss of the model during turning floats to integers. Despite this, 
our accuracy is a little higher than that of FHE-DiNNs model [7]. In addition, the in-
puts of FHE-DiNNs are limited in {-1,1}, it’s application is greatly restricted. Most 
machine learning datasets are not applicable for FHE-DiNNs, since these datasets are 
not binary. Table 2 shows some classic datasets which can apply for the two models. 
Table 3. Comparison of CryptoNets and 2P-DNN. 
Model 2P-DNN CryptoNets 
11 
Accuracy on MNIST 99% 99% 
Active function ReLU function square function 
Computational complexity of active function O(1) O(n) 
 
We also compare the CryptoNets and 2P-DNN in some aspects shown in Table 3. The 
accuracy of the two models are similar. However, the time cost of CryptoNets is more 
than that of 2P-DNN, because the active function of CryptoNets is square function 
and computing square function is slow in Ciphertext. The computing resource cost 
becomes prohibitive as the number of layers increases. Unlike the time cost of active 
function in CryptoNets, ours only depends on decryption operation, which is much 
faster than computation of the square function in ciphertext domain. Therefore, many 
DNN models are more suitable for our 2P-DNN model.  
With respect to the efficiency, we use the Montgomery algorithm[17,18] to accelerate 
the modular exponentiation when images are encrypted. In terms of the structure, 
most of the signal processing model in the encrypted domain cannot be implemented 
by parallel computing, because each step of the algorithms is attached to the oth-
ers[19,20]. However, our model can run by parallel computing, because the single neure 
in one layer is independent. The speed of our model can increases by more than 80% 
with these acceleration algorithms. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we present a Privacy-Preserving Deep Neural Networks Based on Ho-
momorphic Cryptosystem. This model can fulfill the machine learning task in cipher-
text domain. So the MLaaS can use this model to protect the user privacy. The ex-
periments demonstrate that our model can reach the same accuracy compared to the 
model in the plaintext. And the time cost of our model is much lower than other signal 
processing models in the encrypted domain. 
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